United States Copyright Office
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August 12, 2013

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter, & Hampton LLP
Attn: Jill M. Pietrini
1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1600
Los Angeles, CA 90067

Re: Bella's Engagement Ring
Correspondence ID: 1-CHLETA

Dear Ms. Pietrini:

The Review Board of the United States Copyright Office (the "Board") is in receipt of your second request for reconsideration of the Registration Program's refusal to register the work entitled: *Bella's Engagement Ring*. You submitted this request on behalf of your client, Summit Entertainment, LLC, on July 19, 2012. I apologize for the delay in the issuance of this determination. After periods of inaction, staff departures, and budgetary restrictions, the Register of Copyrights has appointed a new Board and we are proceeding with second appeals of registration refusals as expeditiously as possible.

The Board has examined the application, the deposit copies, and all of the correspondence in this case. After careful consideration of the arguments in your second request for reconsideration, the Board affirms the Registration Program's denial of registration of this copyright claim. The Board's reasoning is set forth below. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 202.5(g), this decision constitutes final agency action on this matter.

I. DESCRIPTION OF THE WORK

Bella's Engagement Ring (the "Work") consists of a cluster of roughly forty small diamonds arranged in the shape of an oval and set on a circular ring band. There are small triangles cut out of the band at the points where it joins with the oval of diamonds.

The below image is a photographic reproduction of the Work from the deposit materials:

II. ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

On September 8, 2011, the United States Copyright Office (the "Office") issued a letter notifying Summit Entertainment, LLC (the "Applicant") that it had refused registration of the above mentioned Work. *Letter from Registration Specialist, Kathryn Sukites, to Ilyce Dawes* (September 8, 2011). In its letter, the Office indicated that it could not register the Work because it lacks the authorship necessary to support a copyright claim. *Id.*

In a letter dated December 7, 2011, you requested that, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 202.5(b), the Office reconsider its initial refusal to register the Work. *Letter from Jill Pietrini to Copyright RAC Division* (December 7, 2011) ("First Request"). Your letter set forth the reasons you believed the Office improperly refused registration. *Id.* Upon reviewing the Work in light of the points raised in your letter, the Office concluded that the Work "does not contain a sufficient amount of original and creative artistic or sculptural authorship" in the treatment and arrangement of its elements and again refused registration. *Letter from Attorney-Advisor, Stephanie Mason, to Jill Pietrini* (April 19, 2012).

Finally, in a letter dated July 19, 2011, you requested that, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 202.5(c), the Office reconsider for a second time its refusal to register the Work. *Letter from Jill Pietrini to Copyright R&P Division* (July 19, 2012) ("Second Request"). In arguing that the Office improperly refused registration, you claim the Work includes at least the minimum amount of creativity required to support registration under the standard for

originality set forth in *Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co.*, 499 U.S. 340 (1991). *Second Request* at 1. In support of this argument, you claim that, when analyzed as a whole, the Applicant's arrangement of the Work's constituent elements contain a sufficient amount of creative authorship to warrant registration under the Copyright Act. *Id.* at 3-4.

In addition to *Feist*, your argument references several cases in support of the general principle that, to be sufficiently creative to warrant copyright protection, a work need only possess a "modicum of creativity." *Id.* at 1-3. You also reference several cases that demonstrate jewelry designs comprised of otherwise unprotectable elements are acceptable for copyright protection if the selection and arrangement of those elements satisfies the requisite level of creative authorship. *Id.*

III. DECISION

A. *The Legal Framework*

All copyrightable works must qualify as "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). As used with respect to copyright, the term "original" consists of two components: independent creation and sufficient creativity. *See Feist*, 499 U.S. at 345. First, the work must have been independently created by the author, *i.e.*, not copied from another work. *Id.* Second, the work must possess sufficient creativity. *Id.* While only a modicum of creativity is necessary to establish the requisite level, the Supreme Court has ruled that some works (such as the telephone directory at issue in *Feist*) fail to meet this threshold. *Id.* The Court observed that "[a]s a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess more than a *de minimis* quantum of creativity." *Id.* at 363. It further found that there can be no copyright in a work in which "the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be nonexistent." *Id.* at 359.

The Office's regulations implement the long-standing requirements of originality and creativity set forth in the law and, subsequently, the *Feist* decision. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (prohibiting registration of "[w]ords and short phrases such as names, titles, slogans; familiar symbols or designs; [and] mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring"); *see also* 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (stating "[i]n order to be acceptable as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, the work must embody some creative authorship in its delineation or form").

Case law recognizes instances in which jewelry has enjoyed copyright protection for "the artistic combination and integration" of constituent elements that, considered alone, are unoriginal. *See Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc.*, 262 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2001). However, as noted, the mere simplistic arrangement of unprotectable elements does not automatically establish the level of creativity necessary to warrant protection. *See Feist,* 499 U.S. at 358 (finding the Copyright Act "implies that some ways [of selecting, coordinating, or arranging

uncopyrightable material] will trigger copyright, but that others will not"). Ultimately, the determination of copyrightability in the combination of standard design elements rests on whether the selection, coordination, or arrangement is done in such a way as to result in copyrightable authorship. *Id.*; *see also Atari Games Corp. v. Oman*, 888 F.2d 878 (D. D.C. 1989).

To be clear, the mere simplistic arrangement of non-protectable elements does not automatically establish the level of creativity necessary to warrant protection. For example, the Eighth Circuit upheld the Copyright Office's refusal to register a simple logo consisting of four angled lines which formed an arrow and the word "Arrows" in a cursive script below the arrow. *See John Muller & Co.*, 802 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1986). Likewise, the Ninth Circuit held that a glass sculpture of a jellyfish that consisted of elements including clear glass, an oblong shroud, bright colors, proportion, vertical orientation, and the stereotypical jellyfish form did not merit copyright protection. *See Satava v. Lowry*, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003). The court's language in *Satava* is particularly instructional:

> [i]t is true, of course, that a combination of unprotectable elements may qualify for copyright protection. But it is not true that *any* combination of unprotectable elements automatically qualifies for copyright protection. Our case law suggests, and we hold today, that a combination of unprotectable elements is eligible for copyright protection only if those elements are numerous enough and their selection and arrangement original enough that their combination constitutes an original work of authorship.

Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

Finally, Copyright Office Registration Specialists (and the Board, as well) do not make aesthetic judgments in evaluating the copyrightability of particular works. They are not influenced by the attractiveness of a design, the espoused intentions of the author, the design's uniqueness, its visual effect or appearance, its symbolism, the time and effort it took to create, or its commercial success in the marketplace. *See* 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); *see also Bleistein v. Donaldson*, 188 U.S. 239 (1903). The fact that a work consists of a unique or distinctive shape or style for purposes of aesthetic appeal does not automatically mean that the work, as a whole, constitutes a copyrightable "work of art."

B. *Analysis of the Work*

After carefully examining the Work and applying the legal standards discussed above, the Board finds that the Work fails to satisfy the requirement of creativity.

The Board accepts the principle that jewelry designs comprised of combinations of unprotectable elements may be eligible for copyright protection. However, in order to be accepted for registration, such combinations must contain some distinguishable variation in

the selection, coordination, or arrangement of their elements that is not so obvious or minor that the "creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be nonexistent." *Feist,* 499 U.S at 359; *see also Atari Games,* 888 F.2d at 883. Here, the Work consists of roughly forty small diamonds, a common oval shape, and an ordinary ring band with two small "V" shapes cut into it where the band's ends meet the oval setting. We find that none of these elements, individually, are eligible for copyright protection. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (prohibiting registration of "familiar symbols or designs"). We further find that the Applicant's selection and arrangement of these unprotectable elements is not sufficiently creative to warrant copyright protection. The Work, as a whole, is little more that a selection of small diamonds, fit together so that they form a basic oval shape, and attached to an ordinary ring band. This pairing of common, unprotectable elements is, at best, *de minimis*, and lacks the requisite "creative spark" for copyrightability. *See Feist*, 499 U.S. at 359; *see also* 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.1(a), 202.10(a). Accordingly, we conclude that the Work, as a whole, is ineligible for copyright registration.

Your assertions that the Applicant's arrangement of the diamonds into an oval-shaped configuration is "unconventional" and unique when compared to traditional engagement rings do not add to your claim of sufficient creativity. *Id. at* 4. As discussed above, the Board does not assess novelty, uniqueness, or symbolism in determining whether a work contains the requisite minimal amount of original authorship necessary for registration. Thus, even if accurate, the mere fact that the Work consists of an unconventional arrangement of familiar shapes symbolic of an "engagement ring" would not qualify the Work, as a whole, as copyrightable.

In sum, the Board finds that the Applicant's selection and arrangement of the elements that comprise the Work lack a sufficient level of creativity to make the Work registerable under the Copyright Act.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Review Board of the United States Copyright Office affirms the refusal to register the work entitled: *Bella's Engagement Ring*. This decision constitutes final agency action on this matter. 37 C.F.R. § 202.5(g).

Maria A. Pallante
Register of Copyrights



BY: ______________________
William J. Roberts, Jr.
Copyright Office Review Board