Statement of Marybeth Peters
The Register of Copyrights
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
104th Congress, 2nd Session
September 18, 1996
United States Intellectual Property Organization Act of 1996
Mr. Chairman, members of the Judiciary Committee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify today on this proposed legislation, which
is so important to the future of the U.S. copyright system. My remarks will
be limited to Title I of the bill, which would establish a new U.S. Intellectual
Property Organization as a wholly-owned government corporation, including within
it the Copyright Office.
As the agency responsible
for the administration of U.S. copyright law, the Copyright Office
always strives to achieve an optimal balance between the concerns
of owners and users of copyrighted works, in furtherance of the
broad public interest. We have regularly assisted Congress in
attempts to improve the copyright system and to identify and cure
any problems, and we stand ready to do so today. We must express
grave concerns, however, about the impact on the public of the
specific provisions of Title I, which would effect a fundamental
restructuring of the copyright function of the federal government.
We do not oppose the reorganization of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office as a wholly-owned government corporation, as proposed in
H.R. 3460, passed by the House Committee on the Judiciary on June
11. But the hasty and radical changes proposed in this bill pose
potential problems of serious dimension for the public interest,
and we are not aware of any problems with the existing structure
that could justify the risk of such disruption.
The most obvious of these
potential problems are economic costs and costs in public access
to information. We foresee that placing the Copyright Office
on a self-supporting basis, would require sharply increased registration
fees. Such an increase would place a substantial financial burden
on copyright owners. It is also likely to lead to a steep decline
in the use of the copyright registration system that has long
been a hallmark of U.S. copyright law, providing a valuable public
database today and for the future global electronic marketplace.
Other concerns relate to
non-economic values. The proposed structure would mean the loss
to Congress and the public of a balanced, non-partisan voice in
the formulation of copyright policy. In addition, the basic concept
of copyright would change: for the first time, copyright would
be treated along with patents and trademarks as a form of purely
commercial, industrial property.
The issues raised by the
104 pages of Title I are complex and far-reaching. The Copyright
Office has begun the process of gathering information, analyzing
the issues and assessing their immediate and long-term implications.
Given the short time frame, our analysis is necessarily at a
preliminary stage. At this point, we can identify as many questions
as answers, and believe that much more study is needed to evaluate
fully the impact of the proposals. Meanwhile, we recommend that
the status quo be preserved, and that the patent and trademark
issues be resolved without implicating copyright in any way.
To this end, we urge not only that the specific copyright provisions
be removed from the bill, but also that there be no broad references
to "intellectual property," as such references
may be interpreted to include copyright.
I will begin my remarks with some comments on timing and process. I will then
outline the most significant problems we see with the structure proposed in
Title I, and suggest an approach to evaluating possible changes to the existing
copyright system. My comments will be limited to aspects of the bill specifically
affecting copyright interests. The Librarian of Congress is submitting to the
Committee a separate statement describing the potential impact on the Library.
A. Timing and Process
In evaluating a change of
this magnitude to the basic structure and placement of a government
agency, careful consideration should be given to both the need
for change and the potential consequences. The first question
is whether the current structure causes any problems that are
real, as opposed to theoretical. If so, it is critical to identify
their precise nature and scope. Only then can one answer the
ultimate question: how to solve those problems without creating
new ones. Answering all of these questions requires consultation
with the affected communities to determine their needs and weigh
This process has not yet
taken place with regard to the copyright provisions of S. 1961.
There has been no open, public debate of the issues involved.
Neither the Copyright Office nor members of the private sector
participated in formulating these proposals. Indeed, many interested
parties were unaware that such proposals were being considered
until the bill's introduction shortly before the August recess.
No representative of the author, copyright owner or copyright
user communities were given the opportunity to testify today,
and no further hearings are scheduled. We are aware that many
in these communities have expressed concern about the compressed
timetable and lack of input. This process stands in marked contrast
to that followed for the patent issues presented by S. 1961, which
have been widely aired and debated for years.
Recent experience has shown
the dangers of proceeding with a major structural change in the
government's copyright functions in a short time frame and without
full input and deliberation. In 1993, through a similarly precipitous
process, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (C.R.T.) was abolished,
and replaced by a system of arbitration panels located within
the Copyright Office. In 1996, the first arbitration proceedings
handled under the new system have demonstrated serious problems
with its structure and operation, and the Copyright Office has
already discussed with Committee staff its intention to recommend
to Congress a number of revisions to the law. The lesson from
this experience is that such structural changes require time and
careful consideration in order to work out the bugs and forestall
unintended consequences. The changes proposed in S. 1961 are of
a much greater magnitude in number and complexity than the C.R.T.
legislation, and pose a correspondingly greater potential for
B. The Dangers of the Proposed
1. Impact on fees
First and foremost, we are concerned about the potential impact on fees and
the resulting damage to the existing system of copyright registration and deposit.
Central to the government corporation concept as embodied in Title I is the
mandate that each subdivision be financially self-supporting. Unlike patents
and trademarks, copyright has never been a profit center for the government,
and the bill provides no indication of how this change is to be made.
At present, copyright income (consisting
principally of registration and document filing fees plus a small
percentage of royalty funds allocated to the direct costs of administering
the statutory royalty systems) pays for only a portion of the
Copyright Office's budget ($18 million out of $30 million); the
rest is provided through Congressional appropriations. The Office
is also supported in part by Library services provided without
charge, such as security, financial services and automation support,
and does not pay rent.
Eliminating the cost of appropriations
to the taxpayer is appealing, and we have for some time now been
considering various options to fund a greater proportion of our
costs. For this reason, we urge the Committee to act promptly
on H.R. 1861, the Copyright Clarifications Act, as passed by the
House of Representatives. Section 6 authorizes the Copyright
Office to raise fees, based on a study of various factors, subject
to Congressional review. We are prepared to move promptly to
design a new fee structure, based on reasonable costs to the applicant,
that is fair and equitable giving due consideration to the objectives
of the copyright system.
The additional funds that would
be required to run a self-supporting Office must come from somewhere;
at present, raising fees seems to be the only practical option,
since there are no other sources of income readily available to
the Office. The only obvious alternative would be to divert to
general operating purposes additional funds from the royalty pools
collected under the Copyright Act's compulsory licenses -- a solution
that is not permissible under existing law, and would disproportionately
burden the recipients of those royalties. Our preliminary analysis
indicates that, if our operational costs otherwise remained the
same, becoming self-supporting outside of the Library would entail
a five-fold increase in fees (from $20 to the $100 range). \1\
\1\ While this amount may seem small in relation to patent fees, the comparison is inapt. Simply put, patent fees buy much more. Unlike copyrights, patent rights do not exist without application and payment to the government, and once granted, provide a much stronger, and on average more lucrative legal monopoly. Moreover, every member of the public may be a copyright owner, and a single entity is likely to own many more copyrights than patents, multiplying the cost of registration.
an exponential increase in fees would be detrimental to both copyright
owners and the public generally. As to copyright owners, those
who find it advisable to continue to register their works will
be forced to expend large sums, with a potentially major fiscal
impact. Some copyright owners, such as music publishers or motion
picture companies, own catalogues of hundreds or thousands of
works; aggregate fees could be staggering. Many individual authors
or small businesses will no longer be able to afford to register
on a regular basis. As a result, in many cases, they will be
barred from obtaining meaningful remedies against even willful
infringers. See 17 U.S.C. section 412; Report of the Co-Chairs, Library of Congress Advisory Committee on Copyright Registration and Deposit at 17 (September 1993).
The Copyright Office would of course
be willing to work with Congress and the private sector to find
ways to alleviate the impact. While it might be possible to distinguish
among types of works, keeping fees low for individual authors
and raising them for commercial works or works made for hire,
extremely high fees would result for the latter categories, further
In fact, the impact on fees would
likely be even greater than predicted by our preliminary analysis,
since operational costs in the proposed structure would be higher
than they are today. The bill creates new expenses for the Copyright
Office because of the need to fund a more complex bureaucratic
structure, including a newly-established appeals board and advisory
board. It would also require the Copyright Office to fund one-third
of the entire budget of the office of the Commissioner of Intellectual
Property -- a budget over which we would have no control. This
amount would apparently be added to the cost of funding the Copyright
Commissioner's own office and policy division. As a rough yardstick
of the amount at issue, the 1996 Patent and Trademark Office budgets
for the Executive Office of the Commissioner and the Office of
Legislative and International Affairs together are projected to
exceed $4 million (exclusive of expenses for management planning,
administrative services, automation, and space acquisition and
2. Impact on availability of
information to the public
The damage from increased fees would not be limited to copyright owners, but
would also affect the public generally. As a practical matter, it could mark
the end of a vital and meaningful registration and deposit system.
Historical experience shows that
registrations decrease in number whenever fees are increased.
This experience is likely to be magnified greatly under the current
proposal, as no past increase has ever come close to the amount
that would be entailed here. We expect that many individual copyright
owners would choose not to register their works, and that businesses
would register fewer works. The result would be a diminished
and less valuable public database of information about works of
authorship, making it more difficult for users to determine who
owns what rights at a particular point in time. There would also
be a corresponding decrease in deposit copies of works received
through copyright registrations; the statement of the Librarian
of Congress indicates the quantitative and qualitative impact
that such a decrease in registration deposits would have on the
Such results would be particularly disturbing in light of the recent recommendations
of the Advisory Committee on Copyright Registration and Deposit appointed by
the Librarian of Congress in 1993 and co-chaired by former Register of Copyrights
Barbara Ringer and Robert Wedgeworth, University Librarian, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign. The Advisory Committee (known as "ACCORD") consisted
of copyright experts from the legal and academic communities, as well as representatives
of leading authors', publishers', library and educational groups. After extensive
historical and comparative research and thorough debate, ACCORD strongly affirmed
the value and importance of the U.S. registration system to copyright owners,
users of copyrighted works, and the general public. It recommended the inducement
of increased registration through a combination of legal incentives and Copyright
Office practices aimed at simplifying and facilitating the registration process,
and considered as one potential form of inducement the lowering of existing
3. Impact on digital marketplace
If anything, the value of registration
has become even clearer since the 1993 ACCORD Report, due to new
technologies. The full commercial and informational potential
of the national information infrastructure will remain unrealized
until an efficient, secure and flexible electronic marketplace
is developed for copyrighted works. Effective encryption technology
is one essential component; a source for accurate, up-to-date
information about the ownership of rights is another. In this
context, the role of copyright registration in contributing to
a national public record is more important than ever. The Copyright
Office provides a free, centralized, easily accessible source
of information about copyrighted works, with records that are
international in scope and cover all varieties of works. A Copyright
Office registration system offering integrity, accuracy and completeness
can serve as a key component of the electronic marketplace.
In response to this reality, the
Copyright Office is today working on various projects making registration
and licensing information widely available over digital networks.
One significant project already underway is an electronic registration,
recordation and deposit system (CORDS), developed in conjunction
with the Library of Congress's National Digital Library program.
CORDS entails the receipt and storage of copies of works in secure
digital repositories along with associated rights and permissions
information, including referrals to organizations that manage
rights or provide authorized access to the works. A significant
fall-off in the use of the registration system, and the separation
of the Copyright Office from the Library could be crippling to
such future-looking projects.
4. Equal contribution to budget
of Commissioner of Intellectual Property
We are also concerned about the
proposed funding mechanism for the office of the Commissioner
of Intellectual Property ("C.I.P."). Under the bill,
the C.I.P.'s budget is paid for equally by the subdivisions, Copyrights,
Patents, and Trademarks. This is so despite the fact that copyright
revenues to the U.S. government have always been and will likely
always be dwarfed by the revenues from trademarks and patents
(in 1995, less than $20 million compared to more than $600 million).
This problem has no simple fix,
such as making the contributions from the subdivisions proportional
to their revenues. If they are proportional, then patent policy
concerns will likely predominate in the exercise of the C.I.P.'s
judgment. The lack of an apparent solution is not incidental;
rather, it suggests an inherent misfit in the merger of copyrights
with industrial property.
5. New and continued flaws
in royalty administration system
When Congress abolished the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal in 1993, it established a royalty adjustment
and distribution system using ad hoc three-member
arbitration panels. The royalty distribution provisions in S.
1961 are based on the existing system, with the substitution of
administrative law judges for the three-member panels.
The weaknesses that experience has
revealed in the recently-instituted arbitration system are only
partially cured by S. 1961. In addition, we believe that the
bill may introduce new problems that we have not had time to evaluate
fully. Potential problem areas include: the mechanism for taking
appeals from the administrative law judge's decision; time limits
which may not be practical; the cost allocation of proceedings
among the claimants, including the problem of frivolous claimants
who pay nothing, but impose high costs on other claimants; and
the employment status of the administrative law judges. Careful
consideration, with full participation by the interested parties,
is critical in order to identify and resolve such problems in
order to avoid repeating the shortcomings of the quickly enacted
Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act.
6. Loss of a balanced and neutral
The most significant non-financial
problem we see with the bill is the potential increased politicization
of copyright policy. The Copyright Office has traditionally
served as an expert and non-partisan voice, listening to all perspectives
regardless of economic clout or political affiliation, and seeking
to reach balanced policy judgments. Our recommendations are not
influenced by political agendas or subject to interagency clearance
-- a process that imports non-copyright goals. This tradition
would inevitably change under the proposed structure. The United
States would lose the contribution of a distinctive expert voice
to the tapestry of copyright policymaking, and Congress would
lose a valuable non-partisan advisor.
Similarly, the absolute discretion
over the appointment and continued service of the Commissioner
of Copyrights exercised by the Commissioner of Intellectual Property
may result in a lack of continuity and developed expertise. While
the Register of Copyrights is currently appointed by the Librarian
of Congress, neither the Register's nor the Librarian's tenures
have historically been affected by political turnover in the Administration.
Over the history of the Copyright Office, several Registers have
served long terms and developed distinguished reputations as scholars
and leaders in copyright policy development. Such careers seem
less likely under the proposed structure.
7. Copyrights are different
in nature from industrial property
Finally, by combining copyrights
with patents and trademarks under the policy direction of a single
Commissioner of Intellectual Property, the bill raises a basic
conceptual concern. Copyright differs from industrial property
in fundamental respects. Many other countries, like the United
States, have recognized this difference, handling copyright issues
in their ministries of culture, education or justice, and patent
and trademark issues in their ministries of commerce or trade.
The distinction is also recognized in the two leading international
treaties, which are divided into the respective fields of copyright
(the Berne Convention) and industrial property (the Paris Convention,
covering both patents and trademarks).
To begin with, the subject matter
and scope of protection of even the two closer systems, copyright
and patent, are quite distinct. A joint study by the Patent Office
and the Copyright Office in 1991 stated: "In general, there
appear to be few common elements in the subject matter capable
of protection under the respective statutes. . . . We conclude
that the subject matter overlap in the two statutes appears to
be minimal." Patent-Copyright Laws Overlap Study, Prepared
for the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and the Administration
of Justice by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the U.S.
Copyright Office, at ii-iii (May 1991). Developments in the field
of computer and digital technology have not led to greater convergence.
The Overlap Study considered and explicitly included "computer
related expressions and inventions" in its conclusion. Nor
does the fact that works may be expressed and transmitted in digital
electronic form change the nature or essence of the intellectual
product that is protected.
These types of property also differ
in societal effect. Like industrial property, copyright has tremendous
commercial value, and plays a critical role in the U.S. and global
economies. The economic interests involved are, and must continue
to be, vigorously protected by the government. But copyright
policy should not be entirely driven by economic concerns; copyright
furthers other important values as well. In a qualitatively different
manner from patents or trademarks, it has a unique influence on
culture, education, and the dissemination of knowledge. The existence
and scope of copyright protection affects the kinds of works that
are created, and the ways in which they are used. Every member
of the public is both a creator and a user of copyrighted works,
and these works are the means by which his or her ideas and thoughts
are communicated. In the words of the Supreme Court, "[C]opyright
[is] the engine of free expression." Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985). These values may be slighted if copyright policy is wholly
determined by an entity dedicated to the furtherance of commerce.
C. Evaluating the Existing System:
A Suggested Approach
1. Does a real problem exist?
Congress is not today legislating
in a vacuum, building a new intellectual property system from
the ground up. The copyright function of the United States has
been located in the Library of Congress for 125 years, with the
Copyright Office existing in essentially its present form for
the past century. During that time, the United States has developed
a copyright system that has encouraged the creation of a thriving
marketplace in copyrighted works and has served as a model for
countries around the world. Any proposed change must be evaluated
in light of this record of success.
So far, we do not believe that a
need for change has been established. In 1993, many of the issues
implicated by this bill, including the position of the Register,
the relationship of the Office to the Library, and the value and
functioning of the registration and deposit system, were thoroughly
studied during the ACCORD process in connection with the proposed
Copyright Reform Act. No legislation was ultimately enacted.
Since that time, we have heard no indication from the private
sector of any practical problems relating to the structure and
placement of the Copyright Office, or of any request for change.
In fact, we are not aware of any support for the bill's proposal
from any element of the copyright communities. As to the issues
that have been raised by the Chairman and Committee staff as justifications
for including the Copyright Office in S. 1961, each is either
theoretical in nature or does not relate to the overall structural
a. Executive branch coordination
The principal justification noted
by the Chairman in introducing this bill is a desire to coordinate
all international and domestic intellectual property policymaking
within one office in the executive branch. This solution may
be neat in theory, but overlooks the practical reality of the
multilayered and effective structure that is now in place. The
U.S. copyright function today can be viewed as a tapestry, with
different agencies contributing different threads to the overall
Under the existing structure,
copyright is represented by strong voices in the Administration.
Copyright has achieved high political visibility in recent years,
and is an important component of U.S. economic policy both nationally
and internationally. This result has been realized by coordinating
input from a variety of sources within the government: the U.S.
Trade Representative, the State Department, the Commerce Department,
including the Patent and Trademark Office, and the Copyright Office.
By combining complementary but distinct areas of expertise, these
agencies have offered strength in teamwork, and have furthered
U.S. copyright interests at home and abroad over the past decade
with remarkable success.
This successful teamwork has been
no accident. Congress has over the years considered how best
to allocate the governmental functions relating to copyright,
and has set the basic parameters by assigning different areas
of responsibility to different agencies. The Copyright Office
has been given responsibility to handle policy issues, and has
been authorized to establish an international training program
known as the International Copyright Institute. Areas not specifically
allocated by statute have been divided among the agencies based
on practical considerations of resources and expertise. Thus,
for example, today the U.S. Trade Representative leads negotiations
of bilateral copyright agreements as well as trade agreements,
but relies upon the Copyright Office and the Patent and Trademark
Office for technical expertise.
As to multilateral negotiations,
copyright (as opposed to trade) treaties are primarily administered
through the World Intellectual Property Organization. In this
forum, U.S. delegations have been joint efforts, including representatives
from all agencies with relevant expertise. Leadership of the
delegations has shifted over the years, depending on personnel
and interest, with different agencies taking the lead at different
times. The current round of WIPO negotiations has been led by
the Patent and Trademark Office, with technical assistance from
the Copyright Office. In other years, delegations have been headed
by the Copyright Office and by the State Department. Any evaluation
of the existing structure should consider the complex and beneficial
interactions among the different sources of government expertise
over the years, rather than focusing narrowly on a snapshot of
one part of the picture at one point in time.
In the past, this cooperative approach
to our international efforts has been extraordinarily effective,
without problems of exclusion or of conflicting views. Through
the present day, the Copyright Office has been an active participant
in U.S. negotiations as either the leader of the delegation or
a technical advisor.
On the domestic front, policymaking
has also been cooperative, with the Copyright Office at the forefront
on substantive issues, drawing from our extensive experience with
the day-to-day operations of the copyright law. The Copyright
Office has formulated copyright policy for nearly a century, primarily
through assistance in the development of legislation, issuance
of regulations, and participation in litigation. The Office has
worked closely with congressional committees on a day-to-day basis,
and was integrally involved in drafting the 1976 Copyright Act
as well as working on every subsequent amendment. We regularly
propose changes in the law, and advise Congress on copyright developments
in the United States and abroad. In addition, we cooperate on
many issues with various agencies in the Executive branch, most
frequently the Justice Department and the Patent and Trademark
In sum, the United States today
enjoys the benefits of a flexible copyright structure that allows
it to draw on the finest resources the government has to offer.
The structure is able to function successfully during shifts
in resources and personnel within particular agencies at various
times. We believe the strength of this structure is in part responsible
for the tremendous achievements of U.S. copyright policy in the
international arena in the past decade. It should not be disturbed
b. Relationship with the Library
The remaining justifications that
have been put forward address the relationship between the Copyright
Office and the Library of Congress. Thus, it has been suggested
that conflicts of interest may arise in a structure where the
Register of Copyrights reports to the Librarian of Congress.
The Copyright Office, however, makes its own policy decisions
and recommendations to Congress independently of the Library.
The Library does not always agree with the policies we espouse.
The positions of the Library have, for example, differed in various
respects from those of the Copyright Office on a number of bills
introduced in this Congress.
We also note that the location of
the Copyright Office within the Library may be beneficial for
copyright policymaking. As one of the largest users of copyrighted
materials in the country, and as a leader in the library and nonprofit
community, the Library represents a significant voice in public
debates over copyright. Its ties to the Copyright Office give
it the benefit of a broader perspective on different sides of
the issues, including the long-term impact on copyright owners
and the public of proposed changes in law and practices. This
benefit would be lost if the Office were moved.
At times, the legislative branch
placement of the Copyright Office has raised constitutional separation
of powers issues. The issues have led to decisions on how to
structure the Office's responsibilities, but have not caused practical
problems. As the Congressional Research Service has in the past
advised Congress, concerns about separation of powers would be
misplaced. The Copyright Office is constitutionally capable of
performing any of the ordinary functions of an administrative
agency, since the Register is appointed by the Librarian of Congress,
a Presidential appointee. See Eltra v. Ringer,
579 F.2d 294, 298-301 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding constitutional
under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1978), the power of
the Register of Copyrights to issue rules and regulations: "The
operations of the Office of the Register are administrative and
the Register must accordingly owe his appointment, as he does,
to one who is in turn appointed by the President in accordance
with the Appointments Clause. It is irrelevant that the Office
of the Librarian of Congress is codified under the legislative
branch or that it receives its appropriation as part of the legislative
appropriation. . . . The Supreme Court has properly assumed over
the decades since 1909 that the Copyright Office is an executive
office, operating under the direction of an Officer of the United
States. . . .").
Other issues that have been raised,
such as criticisms of Library management or hiring policies, have
nothing to do with the large structural questions under consideration.
We note that no government entity, whatever its form, is immune
from staffing difficulties. I am pleased to report, however, that
the Copyright Office has made great strides in redressing past
problems in this area. During the past year, we have hired four
highly-qualified lawyers in the Register's Office to work on policy
and international matters.
Nor is the placement of the Copyright
Office within the Library of Congress a mere historical accident.
The Librarian's written statement explains the history and purposes
of the long relationship between the two institutions.
2. Any problems should be resolved
through appropriately tailored solutions,
weighing the costs and benefits
There is no perfect structure for
copyright within the government, given its role in both the furtherance
of commerce and the development and preservation of culture.
Each possible scenario has pros and cons. All of the pros and
cons should be explored and weighed in order to determine whether
any particular structure is preferable to another.
As to any of the issues that have
been raised about the present system, numerous approaches are
possible. This bill presents the most extreme option, abandoning
a more than century-old structure in favor of an inherently flawed
and untested structure. While it may offer certain theoretical
benefits, it poses the risk of substantial harm to the Library
of Congress, to copyright owners, to the registration system,
and to the balance of interests reflected in copyright policymaking.
The change itself would also entail significant transition costs.
We estimate that the one-time cost of moving the Copyright Office
out of the Library of Congress would come to at least $5 million;
the less quantifiable costs would include a loss of productivity
in serving the public before, during, and after the move. Finally,
such a complex structural change often causes unforeseen and unintended
consequences (as demonstrated by the C.R.T. experience). If a
problem is found to exist, other less drastic solutions should
The first priority should be to
determine whether a real problem exists with the current structure.
If so, the Copyright Office would be pleased to assist in analyzing
its scope and helping to find an optimal solution. We are committed
to the health of the U.S. copyright system, not to any particular
structure for its own sake. But at present, no problem is evident,
and certainly none of an urgency that requires precipitous action.
The wholesale move of an entire government agency necessarily
poses risks, and should only be accomplished after careful deliberation.
In our view, the desirability of such a move has not been established,
and the specific proposal set forth in S. 1961 raises potential
problems that could jeopardize valuable elements of the U.S. copyright
We therefore urge that the copyright provisions of Title I be deleted from
any legislation that may be enacted at this time, along with any references
to "intellectual property" generally, in order to provide an opportunity
for full analysis and public debate of the important issues that have been raised.