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In the Matter of
Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act of 2010
Section 302 Report to Congress

Docket No. RM 2010-10

COMMENTS OF DISH NETWORK L.L.C.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 1

II. A STATUTORY LICENSE REMAINS THE ONLY Viable ALTERNATIVE ...... 3

   A. Congress Has Repeatedly Found Statutory Licenses Necessary for a Viable MVPD Service .......................................................... 3

   B. Elimination of Statutory Licenses Would Require Wholesale Changes to Related Communications Laws and Regulations .......................................................................................... 3

   C. Discontinuation of Statutory Licenses Would Cripple the Industry and Harm Consumers ........................................................................................................ 5

   D. Even if the “Hold-Up” Problem Could Somehow Be Resolved, Sublicensing and Collective Licensing Are Not Viable Alternatives........................................................................... 8

III. RATHER THAN ELIMINATE STATUTORY LICENSES, THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE SHOULD RECOMMEND TRANSITIONING TO A SINGLE STATUTORY LICENSE ........................................................................................................ 9

IV. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................ 12
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

DISH Network L.L.C. (“DISH”) responds to the U.S. Copyright Office’s Notice of Inquiry (“NOI”) examining the role of the statutory licensing requirements set forth in Sections 111, 119, and 122 of the Copyright Act.1 In short, none of the alternatives to statutory licensing proposed in the NOI (sublicensing, private licensing, and collective licensing) are workable. In light of the potential for “hold-outs” by rights holders, statutory licensing remains the only solution available to provide local broadcast stations containing content from multiple copyright sources to millions of consumers nationwide.

After thirty years under the statutory licensing regime, it is apparent that all affected industry players – multichannel video programming distributors (“MVPD”s), broadcasters, and copyright holders – have adapted their businesses to reflect the existence of a statutory license for the retransmission of local broadcast stations. The same goes for the communications

regulatory infrastructure; if statutory licensing were eliminated, many other related rules and
regulations would also have to be overhauled or abolished. For example, Congress would have
to extinguish local broadcast mandatory carriage obligations imposed on MVPDs. After all,
DISH would be unable to comply with its must-carry obligations, for example, if for some
reason it could not secure the necessary copyright permissions for some or all of the
programming contained in a given broadcast station’s lineup (which copyright holders are not
obliged to grant absent some statutory mandate). In a similar vein, the network nonduplication
and syndicated exclusivity privileges afforded to broadcasters and others would have to be
eliminated if MVPDs were to lose statutory licensing rights.

Instead of looking for alternatives to statutory licensing as a whole, DISH urges the
Copyright Office to recommend improvements to what is fundamentally a sound approach to this
multiple copyrights problem. Specifically, as DISH urged in 2007, Congress should dispense
with the current three-part statutory regime (one license for cable providers and two separate
licenses for satellite providers) in favor of a single, consolidated statutory license with bright line
rules for the carriage of digital broadcast TV signals applicable to cable and satellite, as well as
online video distributors. Cable and satellite providers compete for the same customers, but
today are treated differently under copyright and communications law in a number of critical
areas. This continued disparate treatment is more attributable to the piecemeal historical
development of the law, rather than to current technological or market differences between the
video platforms.
II. A STATUTORY LICENSE REMAINS THE ONLY VIABLE ALTERNATIVE

A. Congress Has Repeatedly Found Statutory Licenses Necessary for a Viable MVPD Service

When implementing the various provisions of the Copyright Act, Congress recognized that, in the then-current conditions of the market, the MVPD industry could not function without statutory licenses. In considering the cable statutory license in Section 111 of the Copyright Act, the House Judiciary Committee expressly recognized “that it would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable system.”\(^2\) Similarly, when the same Committee considered the Satellite Home Viewer Act in 1988, it recognized that “[n]egotiation of individual copyright royalty agreements is neither feasible nor economic. It would be costly and inefficient for copyright holders to attempt to negotiate and enforce agreements with distributors and individual households when the revenues produced by a single earth station are so small.”\(^3\) Both assessments remain true today.

B. Elimination of Statutory Licenses Would Require Wholesale Changes to Related Communications Laws and Regulations

The statutory licenses do not exist in a vacuum. Significant statutory and regulatory obligations revolve around the licenses. If the licenses were eliminated, many other related rules and regulations also would have to be overhauled or eliminated in turn. For example, Congress would have to extinguish local mandatory carriage obligations imposed on MVPDs. Generally, eligible local broadcast stations can require local cable systems and satellite carriers providing local broadcast station service to carry their signal, so long as the stations comply with certain

Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) rules for electing such carriage. But DISH would be unable to comply with its “must-carry” obligations pursuant to the local broadcaster’s election of mandatory carriage under communications law if for some reason DISH were unable to secure the necessary copyright permissions for some or all of the programs contained in the broadcast station’s lineup.

Similarly, the network nonduplication and syndicated exclusivity privileges afforded to broadcasters and others under FCC rules should be eliminated if MVPDs lose statutory licensing rights. These rules allow local broadcasters and certain program distributors to request that MVPDs delete duplicative programming from imported signals that they retransmit within a local market. Upon such a request, a cable system importing an out-of-market station (and a satellite carrier importing certain superstations) must remove from the imported signal the programming to which the local broadcaster or distributor has exclusive geographic rights. If statutory licenses go away, then there would be no justification for retaining these rules and any associated recourse to the FCC, because the copyright holders could then pursue infringement claims against MVPDs who retransmit the programming beyond the geographic bounds of their license.

Elimination of statutory licensing would also vitiate the FCC’s prohibition on exclusive retransmission consent agreements between a broadcaster and an MVPD. Under this rule, broadcasters are forbidden to grant a single MVPD the exclusive right to retransmit that station

4 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 338(a)(1) (requiring satellite carriers to retransmit a local broadcast station’s signal upon the station’s request in any market in which the satellite carrier provides service under 17 U.S.C. § 122).
5 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.92-93, 76.101-103 (setting forth the FCC’s network nonduplication and syndicated exclusivity restrictions for cable system retransmissions of broadcast programming).
within its local market. But the prohibition would be meaningless if: (a) the broadcaster, while supposedly amenable to granting retransmission consent, holds back the private copyright licenses that would be equally required for any MVPD to retransmit its signal, or (b) an MVPD secures an exclusive copyright license from a third-party copyright holder. Either of these scenarios would undermine the competitiveness of the MVPD market. The market would then likely be balkanized as a handful of MVPDs obtain *de facto* geographic exclusives to retransmit particular must-see stations and raise prices accordingly.

C. **Discontinuation of Statutory Licenses Would Cripple the Industry and Harm Consumers**

The Direct Broadcast Satellite ("DBS") industry, among others, has grown and succeeded in part due to the Copyright Act’s statutory licenses. Indeed, Section 122’s local-into-local license played a significant part in DBS providers’ rapid growth following its enactment in 1999. Despite the proliferation of specialized cable channels, programming on broadcast television channels still accounts for more than one-third of all primetime U.S. television viewing time. Subscribers want and expect to be able to receive this programming as part of their MVPD subscription.

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6 See 47 C.F.R. § 76.65(b)(1)(vi) (making it a violation of the FCC’s rules for either a broadcaster or an MVPD to enter into any exclusive agreement for the retransmission of a broadcast signal).


Due to the critical need to offer local broadcast stations, discontinuation of statutory licenses would cause irreparable harm to the industry. Negotiation of copyright licenses with all the owners of broadcast programming content in the private market is not feasible. The transaction costs – in time, manpower, and externalities – would rapidly overwhelm even the largest MVPDs, not to mention what the burden would do to the smaller cable operators. They would also be asymmetric. Each station would only have to deal with a handful – typically no more than four – distributors.

Since the Copyright Office last reviewed the statutory licenses, no workable marketplace mechanisms have emerged to enable copyrighted works to be efficiently licensed absent a statutory licensing regime. DISH currently retransmits nearly 2,200 broadcast television stations. Each station airs, on average, 5,000 separate programs during the year.\(^9\) Yet broadcasters routinely assert that they lack the rights necessary to sublicense these programs for satellite retransmission. DISH urges the Copyright Office to conduct a factual investigation into the scope of sublicensing rights held by broadcasters, because if what the broadcasters report is true, this means that DISH would have to receive licenses for all works directly from the holders of copyright – that is, DISH would have to negotiate millions of licenses on a periodic basis.

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\(^9\) See Copyright Law Revision: Hearing on S. 1361 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 401 (1973) (Statement of David, Foster, President, National Cable Television Association) (“I would like to answer the question that you asked about why we should have a compulsory license with one flat fee across the board for the industry. The average television station carries approximately 5,000 programs per year. Let’s say that the average cable television system carries five television stations. That would mean that the individual cable system operator would have to negotiate a copyright for about 25,000 individual programs.”).
Even a small cable operator might have to negotiate thousands of licenses. Even if such a massive licensing effort were possible (the hold-out problem, discussed below, indicates that it is not), the transaction costs would threaten to cripple the industry.

A statutory license works so well because it clears thousands of underlying copyrights in all the programs – copyrights that the network or the local affiliate may not have been able to clear – so that an MVPD need only obtain one consent (retransmission consent) from the local broadcaster to provide all the programming. This gives MVPDs a level of certainty – certainty that is critical to business planning – that would be impossible to approach in another system. Market forces have not resulted in an efficient mechanism of private negotiation for these rights. Indeed, as the experience this past year in the retransmission consent arena shows, Congress and the FCC are routinely exhorted to step in when market mechanisms fail. The reason is the hold-out phenomenon: each distributor needs a full complement of the four top networks in each local market. A “no” from any one of them cannot be cured by substituting other programming and would doom the MVPD to being unable to compete. Substitute the thousands of copyright holders that would have to give their consents in private licensing negotiations for the four network stations that have to consent to retransmission, and the result would be chaos.

The “hold-out” problem also creates the potential for a DBS provider to have “holes” in its TV schedule for programs for which it could not negotiate a copyright. The FCC has long noted the fact that a “Swiss cheese” schedule is not in the public interest and has crafted its carriage rules to require MVPDs to carry all of the programming of the broadcast stations they
offer, except for very limited deletions under the network nonduplication, syndicated exclusivity, and sports blackout rules.\textsuperscript{10}

Private licensing raises yet another risk – the risk of coordination among copyright holders. Again, the retransmission arena can yield pertinent lessons. DISH urges the Copyright Office to assess the extent to which broadcasters align their stances on retransmission consent – even tacitly or with conscious parallelism – because this alignment is a harbinger of how things may play out in a private licensing system.

\textbf{D. Even if the “Hold-Up” Problem Could Somehow Be Resolved, Sublicensing and Collective Licensing Are Not Viable Alternatives}

Both sublicensing and collective licensing proposed in the NOI would require government intervention into the market, and would therefore simply swap one type of intervention for another, less well-known and efficient one. Local broadcast stations routinely assert to DISH that their licensing agreements with third-party copyright holders do not include the right to sublicense copyrighted programming for further distribution. This means that MVPDs would be left to negotiate with a mosaic of different entities to carry a single local broadcast station’s signal, including the broadcast network itself, the local broadcast station, major studios, sports leagues and sport teams, independent production companies, and many others. And absent a government mandate for program rights holders to grant sublicensing rights to broadcasters, sublicensing could again result in broadcasters obtaining sublicensing rights for some, but not all, of the content aired by their station, again leaving holes in the broadcasters’ signal.

\textsuperscript{10} See 47 C.F.R. § 76.62(a) (requiring cable systems to carry the entirety of the broadcast signal); 47 C.F.R. § 76.66(j)(1) (requiring satellite carriers to carry the entirety of the broadcast signal).
But requiring broadcasters to acquire sublicensing rights, and program owners to grant such rights, makes no sense. It creates a problem for the sake of trying to solve it by merely exchanging one form of government intervention (statutory licenses for MVPDs) with another (mandatory sublicensing for broadcasters). Nor is collective licensing the answer. As the NOI acknowledges, the government has recognized the need to regulate collective licensing organizations to discourage monopolistic behavior.11 Again, such an approach merely replaces one form of government intervention with another.

A critical benefit of statutory licensing is that it permits the carriage of the multitude of copyrighted materials included in a broadcast signal. The MVPD market could not exist without it. And no alternative mechanism proposed in the NOI could come close to ensuring such carriage.

III. RATHER THAN ELIMINATE STATUTORY LICENSES, THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE SHOULD RECOMMEND TRANSITIONING TO A SINGLE STATUTORY LICENSE

Although statutory licensing should not be eliminated outright, the Copyright Office should recommend to Congress certain adjustments to make the system fairer and easier to implement. Given that cable and satellite now compete for the same customers through, among other things, the provision of local broadcast stations, the current marketplace no longer calls for different licensing regimes between the different types of video distributors. As a result, the Copyright Office should recommend that Congress consider dispensing with the current three-part statutory regime (one license for cable providers and two separate licenses for satellite providers) in favor of a single, consolidated statutory license with bright line rules for the

carriage of digital broadcast TV signals applicable to cable and satellite, as well as online video distributors.

Bringing cable and satellite video competitors under a single regime will level the playing field and foster competition. Such an approach should allow any cable or satellite provider to retransmit any broadcast station subject to: (i) retransmission consent for local stations; (ii) in certain circumstances, deletion of duplicative programming from an imported station’s signal upon request; and (iii) payment of the appropriate royalty for distant stations.

Such a licensing regime would eliminate variations between the cable and satellite licenses that are unsupported by the current marketplace. These differences are both financial and structural. For example, cable providers continue to pay royalties based on an antiquated system tied to cable system size and gross receipts, whereas satellite providers pay a flat, per-subscriber fee. In addition, cable has a single statutory license, Section 111, while its satellite counterpart is divided between the “local-into-local” rights under Section 122 and distant signal rights under Section 119. This dual license approach for satellite providers is far less relevant today, given that technological development and investment have enabled the DBS industry to compete directly with cable by offering local broadcast stations. In fact, DISH is the only MVPD to offer local-into-local service in all 210 designated market areas.

Cable providers also have the certainty that both their “local” and “distant” signal authority is permanent, while DBS must renew the Section 119 license every five years. Not only that, cable providers have significantly broader authority to provide out-of-market signals to customers under the Copyright Act. In contrast, DBS providers are subject to the unwieldy “unserved household” limitation, which is more restrictive than the limits involved under
nonduplication and syndicated exclusivity provisions applicable to cable systems. Moreover, satellite operators are prohibited from providing any distant programming when a household is served by a local affiliate, while a cable system can provide any distant programming it likes to the same household, so long as the cable operator honors valid, program-specific deletion requests from the local affiliate.

Disparate treatment of cable and satellite under copyright law could also have the perverse effect of disadvantaging DBS providers if and when the FCC updates its rules governing retransmission consent. A recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking asks whether “eliminating the [FCC]’s network nonduplication and syndicated exclusivity rules, without abrogating any private contractual provisions, would have a beneficial impact on retransmission consent negotiations.” Although such a move could enable cable systems to bring in an out-of-market station of the same network affiliation during a retransmission consent dispute, any such reforms would not benefit DBS providers. Section 122 allows local-into-local retransmission only, and the Section 119 license would be unavailable except for a minority of consumers – those qualifying as unserved households. The satellite statutory licensing regime would thus

12 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(2)(B)(i) (licensing the retransmission of distant signals by satellite providers to unserved households), with 17 U.S. C. § 111(c) (licensing the retransmission of all broadcast stations by cable systems subject only to compliance with FCC rules) and 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.92-93, 76.101-103 (setting forth the FCC’s network nonduplication and syndicated exclusivity restrictions for cable system retransmissions of broadcast programming).

13 Compare 47 U.S.C. § 339(a)(2)(B)-(C) (precluding the retransmission by satellite carriers of a distant network signal to a household when the satellite carrier also retransmits the local network affiliate to the household, subject to limited exceptions), with C.F.R. §§ 76.94, 76.105 (requiring stations to comply with notification requirements in order to exercise their nonduplication and syndicated exclusivity rights with cable systems).

prevent DISH from taking advantage of rule changes intended to offset the leverage broadcasters enjoy today as a result of their monopoly in their local market.

IV. CONCLUSION

Statutory licenses have played central roles in the development of a vibrant MVPD marketplace. There are no viable alternatives to some form of statutory copyright licenses. Instead of looking to eliminate them, DISH urges the Copyright Office to look for ways to improve on the current system by doing away with disparities between the cable and satellite licenses and exploring a unitary licensing regime.

Respectfully submitted,

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